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Abstract
We investigate the voting rules in the Council of the European Union. It is known that
both the current system, according to the Treaty of Nice, and the voting system proposed
in the Lisbon treaty deviate strongly from the square root law by Penrose which is known
to be the ideal voting rule under certain assumptions. In 2004 S lomczynski and Z˙yczkowski
designed a voting system, now known as the Jagiellonian Compromise, which satisfies the
square root law with very high accuracy. In this system each member state obtains a voting
weight proportional to the square root of the population. Then the quota is fixed in such
a way that the voting power of each country is also proportional to the square root of the
population.
In this paper we investigate to which extent a change of the quota in the Treaty of
Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon may bring the voting power closer to the ideal square root
distribution. Our computations show that even with optimal quota both systems are way
off the ideal power distribution.
1 Introduction
Political power, notably voting power, can be measured through the concept of Power Indices
[FM98], [TP08]. In particular, the Banzhaf Index measures how frequently a given voter is decisive
in a voting panel if all voting outcomes are counted with the same weight (for details see [TP08]
or our discussion below).
The Council of the European Union is a typical example where Power Indices can help to un-
derstand the power structure within this legislative body. In fact, with its current 27 members
and the complicated decision rules voting in the Council is hard to analyze without using math-
ematical tools. The Council consists of one representative of each member state. The members
of the Council have different voting power depending, in a nonsystematic way, on the size of
the country they represent. The current voting system, according to the Treaty of Nice, has
three components. The first component requires the majority of states, the second a qualified
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majority with respect to voting weights (see table 1) assigned to the states by the treaty. The
third component requires that the supporters of a proposal represent at least 62% of the Union’s
population.
The draft constitution contained a new voting system for the Council, the ‘double majority’. This
system was adopted by the Reform Treaty (Treaty of Lisbon), which is currently under discussion,
despite its rejection in a referendum in Ireland. The double majority, as the name suggests, has
two components. To make a proposal pass the Council members supporting it must represent
both a qualified majority (55%) of the states and a qualified majority (65%) of the population of
the European Union.
Obviously, these two voting systems are very different. In fact, they lead to very different distribu-
tions of power among the states. Thus, the question arises, how a fair voting system should look
like. An answer to this was given by Lionel Penrose as early as 1946 [Pe46]. Penrose computed,
what is now known as the Banzhaf Index β(N) for a voter in a country with population N .
He found that β(N) is proportional to 1√
N
. Consequently, in a multinational body, such as the
Council of the EU, with one representative per state each state should have a power proportional
to the square root of the country’s population. This result is known as the square root law by
Penrose [Pe46], [FM98]. There are various considerations about the Council of the EU in con-
nection with the square root law [Ad05], [BBGW00], [Bi04], [Bo04], [BW04], [FM00], [HM02],
[Ho00], [HT06], [Ki01], [Ko05], [Le02], [Li04], [LM03], [LM04], [LW98], [MN07], [Mo02], [Pa05],
[Pl04], [So04], [Su00], [SZ04], [SZ07a], [TW00], [Wi03]. In particular, it is well known that both
the voting rules of the Nice Treaty and those of the Treaty of Lisbon deviate strongly from
the square root distribution of power. Consequently, those voting systems distribute the voting
power unequally among the citizens of the member states [ABF04], [BJ04], [BW03a], [BW03b],
[BW04], [FM04a], [FM04b], [FPS03], [Le02], [Pl03], [Pl04], [PS03].
In 2004 two Polish scientists, Wojciech S lomczynski and Karol Z˙yczkowski devised a voting
system known as the ‘Jagiellonian Compromise’[SZ04], [SZ07a]. In this system each member
state obtains a voting weight proportional to the square root of its population. This does not
automatically give a distribution of power according to the square root law. However, S lomczynski
and Z˙yczkowski observed that this is the case with a particular choice of the quota, i.e. the
threshold to reach a qualified majority. In fact, they found that with a quota of 61.4% the voting
power (as measured by the Banzhaf Index) agrees to a very high degree of accuracy with the
square root law.
The Jagiellonian Compromise was put forward by the Polish government on the EU summit in
Brussels in 2007. However, the heads of states and governments rejected this system in favor of
the double majority. Presumably, at this late stage the summit did not want to change the voting
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rules completely. One might hope that it would be much easier to keep either the basic rules of
the Nice Treaty or those of the Lisbon Treaty and modify a few voting rules. For example, one
could just change the quota involved in such a way that one gets closer to the square root law.
It is our task in this paper to explore to which extent one can approximate the square root
distribution of power by adjusting the quota in the Nice system and for the double majority. We
compute the Banzhaf Indices for a large variety of quota for the different components of the
voting systems. These results are compared to the square root law. As a measure of deviation
from the square root law we consider the sum over all member states of the squared deviations
as well as the maximum (over the states) of the deviation from the square root law.
Besides the distribution of power within the Council we also take into consideration the ability of
the body to make decisions, i.e. the efficiency of the system. This value, also known as decision
probability, is given by the percentage of the constellation of votes, which make a proposal pass:
The higher the efficiency the easier to change the status quo, the lower the efficiency the easier
to block a change. It is clear that an increase of quota will decrease the systems efficiency. While
one might argue that the efficiency of the Council should not be too high to avoid domination
of a big minority of states by a small majority, the efficiency must also be not too low to ensure
the EU’s ability to make decisions at all.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 3 we give a brief introduction of the voting systems
towards the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon. In section 3 we introduce the theory
of voting power and a fair distribution of voting weights. In this context the square root law
of Penrose will be explained. The Jagiellonian Compromise, a voting system which fulfills the
square root law, is mentioned in section 4. With our acquired knowledge we analyze the two
treaties in detail, in particular, the obvious defects concerning the distribution of voting weights,
voting power and the effectiveness will be discussed in section 5. The fifth section is the main
part of this paper. Here, we introduce our course of action to improve the two treaties towards
the principle of equality under European citizens. We present and discuss our results and give
a compromise solution for the current state of affairs. The last section of this paper contains
concluding remarks.
2 Two voting systems for the Council
Since 2001 decision rules for voting in the European Union Council of Ministers are laid down in
the Treaty of Nice: Each Member State of the European Union is assigned a voting weight (see
table 1) which is a result of negotiation among the Member States. This value reflects to some
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degree the country’s population. The Council adopts a proposal if the following three conditions
(“triple majority”) are satisfied:
1. The sum of the weights of the Member States vote in favor is at least 255 (of 345).
2. A simple majority of Member States vote in favor is required (14 of 27).
3. The Member States forming the simple majority represent at least 62% of the overall
population of the European Union.
Table 1:
Voting weights by the Treaty of Nice
Member State Weight Member State Weight Member State Weight
Germany 29 Belgium 12 Finland 7
France 29 Portugal 12 Ireland 7
United Kingdom 29 Czech Republic 12 Lituania 7
Italy 29 Hungary 12 Latvia 4
Spain 27 Sweden 10 Slovenia 4
Poland 27 Austria 10 Estonia 4
Romania 14 Bulgaria 10 Cyprus 4
Netherlands 13 Denmark 7 Luxembourg 4
Greece 12 Slovak Republic 7 Malta 3
Mathematical analyses have shown that the three voting criteria have different effects as far as
the voting outcome concerned. The first condition is the most significant one: If a qualified
majority of voting weights is achieved, then in the most instances these voting weights are given
by a simple majority of Member States. In contrast, the third condition has a much similar effect
on the voting outcome: The probability of forming a coalition which would meet only the first
and second but not the third condition is extremely low [FM01], [Ki01]. Moreover, most experts
agree that Nice has major drawbacks. A first one lies in the decision making efficiency of the
voting body. The decision making efficiency is equal to the probability that a random proposal
will be passed by vote. Here, the value of this quantity is very low with 2.03%1. There already
exist publications about modifying Nice such that voting power doesn’t change fundamentally
1Data for calculations are used from EUROSTAT: First results of the demographic data collection for 2008 in
Europe.
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but its formal effectiveness increases significantly [BBGW00], [BW04]. A second drawback of
Nice lies in the required efforts to extend the European Union. Any extension of the Union needs
a new negotiations of voting weights and thresholds.
From 2014 on an alternative voting system laid down in the Treaty of Lisbon should replace the
current voting system according to the Treaty of Nice. The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in Rome
in 2004 but it is not ratified until now, i.e. the Republic of Ireland has rejected it. According to the
Treaty of Lisbon the Council adopts a proposal if the following two criteria (“double majority”)
are satisfied:
1. At least 55% of the Member States vote in favor is required (15 of 27).
2. The Member States forming the qualified majority represent at least 65% of the overall
population of the European Union.
In addition, a blocking minority must include at least four Members, failing which the qualified
majority shall be deemed attained. We disregard this last condition because it has no appreciable
effect. The same procedure is also contained in the draft constitution of the European Convention.
The voting system for the Council according to the Treaty of Lisbon is less complex than the
current system of Nice because only two criteria must be satisfied. More precisely, there are no
extra weights for each state like appointed in condition 1 of the Nice Treaty. Voting weights
according to Lisbon are applied directly proportional to the population of each individual Member
State and the decision making efficiency is reasonably balanced with a value of 12.83%. Moreover,
any further extension of the Union is easy practicable because there is an explicit procedure how
to calculate the voting weights.
Summarizing, one might receive the impression that the voting system according to Lisbon is
“better” or “more fair” than the one according to Nice. Analyses have shown that this is not
the case: A fair voting system of the European Union Council of Ministers should be based on a
compromise between the two principles: “equality of Member States” and, in particular, “equality
of citizens”. Both the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon violate these two fundamental
requirements. We will verify this statement due to concepts of the theory of voting power and
its fair distribution.
3 The theory of voting power
Voting systems consist of a set of voters and voting rules. The voting rules determine whether
a proposal is accepted or not. Frequently, there are voting weights assigned to each voter.
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Additionally a decision threshold is defined: a proposal will be passed if the sum of the weights
of the members, who vote in favor, meets or exceeds the given threshold.
An important aspect of voting systems is the political power of the members which is also known
as voting power. Voting power is a mathematical concept which quantifies the influence a voter
has on election at the system. Its theory can be traced back to works of Penrose and Banzhaf
[Pe46], [Ba65]. (See also [SS54], [DP78], [Jo78] for alternative concepts.) Assume a member
can either vote in favor or against a proposal within a decision. Then he or she has influence on
the decision if he or she can turn the voting outcome by changing his or her voting behavior (to
make the proposal pass by voting in favor and to make it fail otherwise). In such a situation a
member is decisive. This decisiveness is the basic idea behind voting power [FM98].
There are several methods to measure the voting power of a member. These methods are
developed in the theory of the indices of political power (see books [FM98], [TP08]). Power
indices count in different ways in what extend an actor is decisive. One of the most popular
ones is the Banzhaf Index [Ba65]. The Banzhaf Index measures the a priori voting power of each
member of a voting body without any previous knowledge of the single voters. Therefore it is
natural to assume that all potential coalitions are equally likely. In the course of an extension of
the European Union a priori power indices are useful to apply the mentioned principles of equality
equally to new members as well as old ones (see also [Le03]). Thus, we use the Banzhaf Index
for analyses of distribution of voting power of the members in the Council [ABF04], [BBGW00],
[BJ04], [BW03a], [BW03b], [BW04], [FM00], [FM04a], [Le02], [Pl04], [SZ04].[SZ07a]. The
Banzhaf Index is defined as follows. Assume n is the number of members of a voting system.
Consider each possible coalition within a member i. These are 2n−1. Then, the total Banzhaf
Index of i, TBi, is equal to the number of coalitions for which i is decisive. The normalized
Banzhaf Index of i, NBi, is equal to the probability that i is decisive: NBi =
TBi
2n−1 . Finally, the
percentage of influence i has is given by the Banzhaf Index of i, βi =
TBiPn
j=1NBj
. This quantity
expresses the relative share of potential voting power of a member i in the voting body. For
example see the distribution of voting power of the European Economic Community of 1958-
1972 in [TP08]. Additionally, little shifts of quota yield to different voting power distributions.
Generally, the voting power of a member is not equal to his voting weight. This is due to the
situation that voting power held by a given country depends not only on its voting weight but
also on the distribution of the weights among all remaining Member States. In the case of the
Council voting power should be distributed primarily satisfying equality under European citizens.
A citizen has influence on an election in his country only if the other voters are split in two
equal parts if a simple majority of votes in favor is required. The probability that this happens
is approximately proportional to the inverse of the square root of the number of citizens (see for
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examples [Ki04], [KMSZ04], [SZ04], [SZ06], [SZ07a]). So, if a country has N citizens, then the
influence of a citizen on a country’s decision is proportional to 1√
N
. If we want to give all citizens
the same influence on the Council’s decision regardless of their home country we have to assign
voting power in the Council proportional to
√
N . This is the square root law of Penrose.
Summarizing, the ideal distribution of voting power in the case of indirect voting consists of the
Banzhaf Indices β0i =
√
NiPn
j=1
√
Nj
for each member i. Here Ni represents the population factor of
each state i.
To obtain a system with an ideal or fair distribution of voting power it is obvious to choose the
voting weight of each Member State proportional to the square root of its population, thus equal
to
√
Ni. This is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. Finally, the distribution of voting
power depends on the quota (the threshold to make a proposal pass). There exists an optimal
quota for which the voting power of any state is proportional to its voting weight [FLMR07],
[SZ06], [SZZ06], [SZ07b]. To gain this optimal quota q0 we use the method of least squares:
That choice of q which has its least value of the sum of squared residuals σq is our demanded
quota. Thus, we minimize the value of the term σ2q =
∑n
i=1(β0i − βqi)2 which depends on
the given quota q. σ2q is also called error rate. In addition, the value of
β0i−βqi
β0i
expresses the
relative deviation between demanded and obtained voting power. In the case of a minimal error
rate voting weights and voting power equals best possibly. The less the error rate σq0 the more
transparent the system.
In 2007 S lomczynski and Z˙yczkowski presented a simple mathematical formula to approximate
such a quota q0, in particular q0 =
1
2
(
1 +
√
N1+···+Nn√
N1+···+
√
Nn
)
, which yields to q0 = 61.57%
2 [SZ07b].
This new calculation method can only be used if there are voting weights distributed as proposed
by Penrose and equality under citizens with only one voting criterion is required. If there is a
different voting weight distribution or there exist more than one quota to determine we have to
work with the least squares method.
The European Union is not only a union of individuals but also a union of states. An additional
requirement of a simple majority of Member States (“One State, One Vote”) would cause only
a moderate deviation from the ideal case [Ki04], [KMSZ04], [KSZ07]. Indeed a new optimal
quota q∗0 can be calculated with less discrepancies in the voting power distribution than with the
previous q0. Therefore we have to use the method of least squares again.
Beyond a fair distribution of influence we should consider the effectiveness of a system. Effective-
ness is equal to the decision probability the voting body passes a proposal. This quantity is also
called the Coleman power of a collectivity act [Co71]. Assuming that all coalitions are equally
2Data from EUROSTAT: First results of the demographic data collection for 2008 in Europe.
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likely its value is given by the percentage of the constellation of votes, which make a proposal
pass: The higher the effectiveness the easier to change the status quo, the lower the rate the
easier to block a change. So, the degree of the effectiveness depends on the given voting rules,
in particular the quotas.
Voting systems based on the square root low of Penrose were proposed and discussed many times.
One of the best-known proposals is the Jagiellonian Compromise.
4 The Jagiellonian Compromise
In 2004 the polish scientists, Wojciech S lomczynski and Karol Z˙yczkowski, from the Jagiellonian
University of Krako´w, Poland, presented a voting system for the Council of Ministers of the
European Union, the Jagiellonian Compromise [SZ04], [SZ06], [SZ07a]. They constructed a
voting system as follows: The voting weight of each Member State is chosen according to
the square root law of Penrose, thus equal to
√
Ni where Ni is the population factor of the
i-th Member State. Then, an optimal quota q is calculated using the methods above. The
Jagiellonian Compromise is also known as P − q% solution due to the work of Penrose.
With current population data we gain an optimal quota q0 = 61.5% with a minimal error rate
of 0.00005h. Our analyses have shown that the maximal relative deviation between β0i and its
corresponding βq0i is about the less value of 0.14%. In addition, the effectiveness value is about
16.43%. For voting weights and voting power see table 2.
Some advantages arise from the proposed voting system: First of all it is simple, because it is
based on a single criterion, more precisely, only one condition must be satisfied. It is neutral by
reason that it cannot a priori favor or handicap any Member State. It is fair, because every citizen
has the same potential influence on decisions regardless from his home country. It is transparent
in the case that voting power and voting weight are almost equal. It is easy extendible: any new
Member State achieves a voting weight proportional to the square root of its population factor.
Solely a new optimal quota must be calculated. It is moderately efficient because an addition of
Member States does not decrease the effectiveness.
On closer observation the additional requirement of a simple majority of Member States (in
the following denoted by JC+) is postulated with an equal q0. That yields to an error rate of
0.07425h. The relative voting power deviation takes a maximum value of 30.64%. This is no
more a moderate deviation from the ideal case. Only the effectiveness value almost levels off
with 16.08%. Observing the least squares we gain a new optimal quota of q∗0 = 64.7%. Here,
the error rate takes its minimum value of 0.03275h. This is only the half of the error rate value
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Table 2:
Distribution of votes and voting power on the Council of Ministers
The Jagiellonian Compromise - P-61.5 solution
Member State Population Population voting weight Banzhaf Index
square root in % βi in %
Germany 82.221.808 9.067,6242 9,4108 9,3978
France 63.753.140 7.984,5563 8,2867 8,2933
United Kingdom 61.185.981 7.822,1468 8,1181 8,1254
Italy 59.618.114 7.721,2767 8,0135 8,0214
Spain 45.283.259 6.729,2837 6,9839 6,9924
Poland 38.115.641 6.173,7866 6,4074 6,4141
Romania 21.528.627 4.639,8951 4,8155 4,8175
Netherlands 16.404.282 4.050,2200 4,2035 4,2038
Greece 11.214.992 3.348,8792 3,4756 3,4746
Belgium 10.666.866 3.266,0168 3,3896 3,3885
Portugal 10.617.575 3.258,4621 3,3818 3,3807
Czech Republic 10.381.130 3.221,9761 3,3439 3,3428
Hungary 10.045.000 3.169,3848 3,2893 3,2881
Sweden 9.182.927 3.030,3345 3,1450 3,1437
Austria 8.331.930 2.886,5083 2,9957 2,9939
Bulgaria 7.640.238 2.764,098 2,8687 2,8671
Denmark 5.475.791 2.340,0408 2,4286 2,4269
Slovak Republic 5.400.998 2.324,0047 2,4119 2,4100
Finland 5.300.484 2.302,278 2,3894 2,3876
Ireland 4.419.859 2.102,3461 2,1819 2,1801
Lituania 3.366.357 1.834,7635 1,9042 1,9025
Latvia 2.270.894 1.506,9486 1,5640 1,5623
Slovenia 2.025.866 1.423,3292 1,4772 1,4757
Estonia 1.340.935 1.157,9875 1,2018 1,2003
Cyprus 794.580 891,3922 0,9251 0,9241
Luxembourg 483.799 695,5566 0,7219 0,7210
Malta 410.584 640,7683 0,6650 0,6642
Sum 497.481.657 96353,8647 100 100
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than with an unchanged quota. The maximal relative deviation is only about 11.68%. This is
nearly one third in comparison with q0. However, the effectiveness decreases on the lower value
of 10.39%. In terms of an as best as possible fair distribution of voting the quota q∗ should be
applied. Figure 1 shows that the voting power of the JC+ 64.7-solution is better approximated
to Penrose’s β0 than the JC+ 61.5-solution.
Figure 1:
Various efforts have been made to promote this ideal system. For examples, in 2004 about 50
scientists supported the Jagiellonian Compromise in an open letter to the governments of the
European Union Member States with the title “Scientists for a democratic Europe”. Moreover,
in the course of the EU summit in Brussels in 2007 the polish mission statement “The square root
or death” made the problem the subject of discussions again, unfortunately, without observable
success.
5 Penrose vs. the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon
With the acquired knowledge about voting power and its fair distribution we will have a second
look on the two treaties for the European Union. The voting power values according to the
Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon are shown in table 3. First of all, both systems are not
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simple, because at least two conditions must be satisfied. The votes, weights and thresholds
for the Council laid down in both treaties are not scientific based chosen. They are results of
negotiations among the Member States. Thus, both systems are not objective. In addition, they
violate the square root law, because the voting power is not distributed like Penrose specified.
This is obviously shown by the corresponding error rates and deviations in voting power (see
figures 2-5). According to the Treaty of Nice the four biggest states, Germany, France, United
Kingdom and Italy, are assigned with too little voting power in comparison with the optimal
voting weights β0. In contrast, especially Spain and Poland achieve too much power also some
middle Member States and the four smallest Estonia, Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta. Here, the
maximal relative deviation in voting power is about 73.18%. The corresponding error rate has a
value of 0.6052h.
According to the Treaty of Lisbon especially the bigger and the smaller Member States achieve
more voting power. Thus the middle States are suffered of this. Here the error rate is very high
with 1.2438h. Also the maximal relative deviation is about 137.53%. Hence, both systems are
not representative. They do not fulfill the principle “One Person, One Vote”. Moreover, it is
quite obvious that voting weight and resulting voting power deviate strongly in comparison to the
deviations in obtained and demanded voting power according to the Jagiellonian Compromise.
Thus, both systems are not transparent. According to the Treaty of Lisbon an extension of the
European Union is easy practicable in the way that it needs no negotiations among the Member
States about voting weights. Contrariwise, the Treaty of Nice always required new debates.
As denoted above the decision making efficiency according to the Treaty of Nice is very low: It
is about 2.03%. The effectiveness of the Treaty of Lisbon is about 12.83% which is only a little
bit higher than in the case of the Jagiellonian Compromise with an additional requirement of a
simple majority of Member States.
Summarizing, Nice has less power distortions than Lisbon but it is more complex. Unfortunately,
the effectiveness of Nice hardly allows changes of the status quo. The current voting rules, weights
and thresholds were fully discussed whole nights long without scientific based background. In
addition, we know from the European Economic Community of 1958-1973 that little shifts of
the quota yield to different voting power distributions. It would be a fortunate coincidence if the
current thresholds produce the best possible error rate measured by the ideal voting weights due
to Penrose.
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Table 3:
Distribution of votes and voting power on the Council of Ministers
The Treaty of Lisbon 55/65 The Treaty of Nice 255
Member State Population Population Banzhaf Index Votes in Weight Banzhaf Index
in % βi in % the Council in % βi in %
Germany 82.221.808 16,53 11,5362 29 8,41 7,7828
France 63.753.140 12,82 9,0667 29 8,41 7,7828
United Kingdom 61.185.981 12,30 8,7322 29 8,41 7,7827
Italy 59.618.114 11,98 8,5360 29 8,41 7,7827
Spain 45.283.259 9,10 6,6893 27 7,83 7,4199
Poland 38.115.641 7,66 5,6050 27 7,83 7,4198
Romania 21.528.627 4,33 4,1306 14 4,06 4,2591
Netherlands 16.404.282 3,30 3,4952 13 3,77 3,974
Greece 11.214.992 2,25 2,8747 12 3,48 3,6843
Belgium 10.666.866 2,14 2,8092 12 3,48 3,6843
Portugal 10.617.575 2,13 2,8033 12 3,48 3,6843
Czech Republic 10.381.130 2,09 2,7750 12 3,48 3,6843
Hungary 10.045.000 2,02 2,7349 12 3,48 3,6843
Sweden 9.182.927 1,85 2,6321 10 2,90 3,0924
Austria 8.331.930 1,67 2,5302 10 2,90 3,0924
Bulgaria 7.640.238 1,54 2,4478 10 2,90 3,0924
Denmark 5.475.791 1,10 2,1891 7 2,03 2,1809
Slovak Republic 5.400.998 1,09 2,1803 7 2,03 2,1809
Finland 5.300.484 1,07 2,1681 7 2,03 2,1809
Ireland 4.419.859 0,89 2,0625 7 2,03 2,1809
Lituania 3.366.357 0,68 1,9362 7 2,03 2,1809
Latvia 2.270.894 0,46 1,8044 4 1,16 1,2502
Slovenia 2.025.866 0,41 1,7747 4 1,16 1,2502
Estonia 1.340.935 0,27 1,6920 4 1,16 1,2502
Cyprus 794.580 0,16 1,6260 4 1,16 1,2502
Luxembourg 483.799 0,10 1,5886 4 1,16 1,2502
Malta 410.584 0,08 1,5796 3 0,87 0,9422
Sum 497.481.657 100,00 100,0000 345 100 100
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6 Improvements
It is our goal to optimize the current Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon. Therefore, we
fractionally modify the voting rules: The existing voting weights will be unchanged retained and
only the several (up to three) thresholds will be shifted. We search for a constellation of quotas
such that the resulting Banzhaf Indices reach the least possible error rate. Therefore, we have
programmed a Java-applet which calculates for several thresholds tuples the Banzhaf Index values
of each Member State, the corresponding error rates, the maximal deviations between demanded
and obtained voting power and the effectiveness of the voting systems. As basis data we use the
population values from EUROSTAT 2008 (see table 2).
The Treaty of Nice will be investigated with an unchanged simple majority of Member States,
thus 14. The quota of the sum of voting weights (currently 255 (=73,91%)) will be shifted from
190 (=55.07%) up to 275 (=79.71%) in integers. For each given quota of voting weights we
shift the overall population quota (currently 62%) from 51% up to 85% in steps of 1%.
The Treaty of Lisbon will be analyzed with integer majority of Member States from 14 up to 18
(currently 15). A majority of 14 states relates to a relative majority of 48.15% up to 51.85%
(13
27
= 48.15%), 15 up to 55.55%, also 18 up to 66.66%. For each given integer majority, we
shift the overall population quota (currently 65%) from 51% up to 85% in steps of 0.1%.
Beyond our boundary values the error rate significantly increases. This is due to the fact, that a
higher quota give more power to smaller states (a proposal will be passed with almost unanimity)
and lower quota more power to bigger states. Furthermore, we want to include the corresponding
effectiveness value within our approach of optimization. It is easy to see that the decision making
efficiency goes to zero with increasing quota.
In the case of the Treaty of Nice our calculations have produced the threshold tuple (14/263/80%)
due to the least minimal error rate of 0.2286h. Compared with the Jagiellonian Compromise
(0.00005h) Nice’s best possible error rate still deviates strongly from the ideal case. This is also
indicated by a maximal relative deviation in voting power with 42.9% (JC: 0.14%). Therewith,
the effectiveness is very low with 0.99%.
In the case of the Treaty of Lisbon our calculations have produced the threshold tuple (17/77.5%)
due to the least minimal error rate of 0.52118h. Compared with Nice the best possible error
rate of Lisbon is additionally 127% higher. This is also indicated by a maximal relative deviation
in voting power with 135.51% (JC: 0.14%). Concluding, the effectiveness is very low with 2.23%
thus near to Nice in its current version.
Using the examples of Nice (14/255/.), (14/263/.) and Lisbon (15/.), (17/.) the development
of error rates and effectiveness by shifting the population quota is pictured in the diagrams 2
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and 3. Comparisons of Nice in versions (14/255/62%) and (14/263/80%) and Lisbon in versions
(15/65%) and (17/77.5%) are shown in the figures 4 and 5. In particular, in both cases Germany’s
large deviation between demanded and obtained influence is strongly decreased. According to
Nice both Spain and Poland are still assigned too much voting power as specified by Penrose.
According to Lisbon middle-size States are still assigned with little voting power and small and
big States with too much.
Summarizing, our optimized threshold tuples produce less deviations in voting power measured
by the least possible error rate than the current versions. Nevertheless, each quota constellation
produce a significant deviation to Penrose’s ideal case. For comparison, in the appendix we have
listed several threshold tuples with fixed voting weight and State quota and optimized population
quota such with minimal error rate. In addition, the values of the related maximal relative devi-
ation in voting power show that the resulted systems are neither transparent nor representative.
Moreover, these optimizations due to the error rates lead to a very low effectiveness. Thus, in
such voting systems it would be easy to block proposals.
Due to these results we reconsider our analyses and include the effectiveness values in our solution
approach. One approach might be to find a compromise between current error rate, optimal error
rate and a reasonable decision probability. Therefore, we are geared to the effectiveness value of
the Jagiellonian Compromise including the requirement of a simple majority of Member States
thus 10.39%. According to the Treaty of Nice we refer to the threshold tuple (14/220/66%).
We gain an error rate of 1.07h, a maximal relative deviation of 37.43% and an effectiveness of
10.52%. According to Treaty of Lisbon we refer to the threshold tuple (15/67.5%). This yield
to an error rate of 1.5975h, a deviation of 106.62% and an effectiveness of 10.36%. Certainly,
there are several solutions for constellations of effectiveness and error rate values supposable.
But, by now it might be conceivable that it needs many new debates among the Member States
and a lot of time to find such distribution keys.
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Figure 2:
Figure 3:
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Figure 4:
Figure 5:
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7 Conclusions
As several publications have shown both voting systems for the Council of Ministers of the
European Union according to the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty of Lisbon deviate strongly from
Penrose’s solution of a fair distribution of voting power in such a voting body. In this publication
we tried to improve these treaties with respect to such a fair distribution. To do so we modified
the voting rules by keeping the voting weights and only shifting the thresholds. This procedure
results only in a modest improvement of the system. Even with optimal quota both systems
deviate strongly from a fair distribution of power. Thus, both the Treaty of Nice and the Treaty
of Lisbon turn out to be invariably suboptimal.
As a consequence the voting system for the Council has to be changed in a more fundamental
way than merely adjusting quota. It seems to us that the Jagiellonian Compromise is a good
basis for a new voting system.
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8 Appendix
Table 4:
The optimal threshold values for the Treaty of Lisbon
Quota of Quota of Sum of square maximal relative Effectiveness
States Population residuals in h deviation in % in %
14 0,555 1,08417 173,55 28,33
14 0,600 1,83319 116,39 21,89
15 0,618 1,07222 180,26 16,13
15 0,650 1,24384 137,53 12,83
15 0,675 1,59748 106,62 10,36
16 0,698 0,83352 161,88 6,74
17 0,775 0,52118 135,51 2,23
18 0,823 0,75088 163,24 0,78
optimal values 0,52118 116,39 28,33
Table 5:
The optimal threshold values for the Jagiellonian Compromise
Quota of Quota of Sum of square maximal relative Effectiveness
States Population residuals in h deviation in % in %
0,615 0,00005 0,14 16,43
14 0,615 0,07425 30,64 16,08
14 0,647 0,03275 11,68 10,39
optimal values 0,00005 0,14 16,43
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Table 6:
The optimal threshold values for the Treaty of Nice
Quota of Quota of Quota of Sum of square maximal relative Effectiveness
States Weights Population residuals in h deviation in % in %
14 190 0,54 0,5192 142,08 27,74
14 195 0,55 0,3966 118,83 25,27
14 200 0,56 0,3388 95,61 22,11
14 205 0,58 0,3367 83,65 19,47
14 210 0,59 0,3646 75,48 16,85
14 215 0,60 0,3913 68,49 14,33
14 220 0,61 0,4099 63,33 11,97
14 225 0,63 0,4096 57,66 9,65
14 230 0,64 0,4117 58,76 7,79
14 235 0,66 0,4143 58,91 6,11
14 240 0,67 0,4188 61,38 4,77
14 245 0,72 0,4077 49,53 3,45
14 250 0,74 0,3469 49,47 2,55
14 255 0,62 0,6052 73,18 2,03
14 255 0,77 0,3016 45,76 1,76
14 258 0,62 0,6373 74,58 1,66
14 258 0,78 0,2620 46,73 1,44
14 259 0,79 0,2515 40,34 1,30
14 260 0,79 0,2391 43,76 1,23
14 261 0,79 0,2373 47,85 1,17
14 262 0,80 0,2372 39,38 1,04
14 263 0,80 0,2286 42,90 0,99
14 264 0,80 0,2318 47,58 0,93
14 265 0,80 0,2445 51,09 0,88
14 270 0,82 0,2762 49,75 0,58
14 275 0,84 0,3587 61,37 0,38
optimal values 0,2286 39,3825 27,74
